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It is my sincerest hope that if there is one thing that people take away from
Moral Fictionalism, it is the recognition that standard noncognitivism involves
a syndrome of three, logically distinct claims.
Standard noncognitivists claim that moral judgment is not belief or any
other cognitive attitude but is, rather, a noncognitive attitude more akin
to desire; that this noncognitive attitude is expressed by our public moral
utterances; and, hence, that our public moral utterances lack a distinctively
moral subject matter and so are not answerable to the moral facts. Notice,
however, that these are logically distinct claimsthe rst is a psychological
claim, the second and third, positive and negative semantic claims, respectively.
We can regiment the familiar technical vocabulary as follow: CHANGE
SLIDE
• Cognitivists claim thatmoral acceptance is best explained bymoral belief
while noncognitivists claim that moral acceptance is best explained by
attitudes other than moral belief. This dierence is partly a dierence
in the nature of the attitudes involved in moral commitment whether
they are cognitive or noncognitive and partly a dierence in the content
of these attitudes whether the cognitive attitudes involved, if any, have
moral propositions as their objects. Let noncognitivism, then, be the
claim that the acceptance of a moral sentence is a some attitude other
than belief in a moral proposition. This is a psychological claimit
is a claim about the nature and content of the attitudes involved in
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moral acceptance. Standard noncognitivists typically claim more than
this. They make, in addition, positive and negative claims about moral
semantics. CHANGESLIDE
• Let expressivism be the claim that the meaning of a moral sentence is de-
termined by the attitude its utterance expresses. This is a positive claim
about the semantics of moral discourseit provides positive information
about the determinants of moral meaning. Standard noncognitivists also
typically make a negative semantic claim. CHANGESLIDE
• Let nonfactualism be the claim that the meaning of a moral sentence fails
to represent a distinctive domain of moral fact. Specically, moral sen-
tences do not express moral propositionspropositions that represent
moral objects, qualities, and relations. The meaning of a moral sentence
may be representational, at least in part; but if it is, it represents nothing
distinctively moral.
These claims are logically distinct. The meaning of moral sentence may be
determined by the noncognitive attitude its utterance expresses, but it may
thereby come to represent the moral factsit may thereby come to represent
the existence and distribution of moral objects, qualities, and relations. So,
for example, freestanding attributions of goodness may commend their ob-
jects, but in so commending they may represent their objects as good. This
would be a kind of moral conceptual role semantics and one that determines a
representational semantics for attributions of goodness. Horwich 2005 and
Wedgwood 2001 have similar approaches to moral semantics and Gibbard
2003 is now at least agnostic about this possibility. Thus, expressivism does
not entail nonfactualism. Nor does the converse entailment hold. Consider
redundancy theories of truth that maintain that a sentence and the corre-
sponding truth-ascription mean the same. Truth-ascriptions, so understood,
do not represent sentences or the propositions they express as instantiating the
property, truth for, if they did, sentence and corresponding truth-ascription
would dier in meaning. But the meaning of truth-ascriptions neednt be
determined by the noncognitive attitudes expressed. Crucially, and more ob-
viously once stated, the psychological claim of noncognitivism entails neither
semantic claim. CHANGESLIDE
This last observation has an important taxonomic consequence since it
allows for the possibility of a ctionalist form of noncognitivism distinct from
the more familiar standard noncognitivism. Specically, if noncognitivism just
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Three Claims Frege–Geach Problem An Old Problem in a New Guise? Meeting the Challenge Summary
Noncognitivism, Expressivism, Nonfactualism
Standard Noncognitivism involves a syndrome of three logically
distinct claims:
Noncognitivism The acceptance of a moral sentence is a
noncognitive attitude
Expressivism The meaning of moral sentence is determined by the
noncognitive attitude its utterance expresses
Nonfactualism The meaning of moral sentence fails to represent a
distinctive domain of moral fact
Figure 1: Noncognitivism, Expressivism, Nonfactualism
is the claim that moral acceptance is a noncognitive attitude, then whats to
prevent this attitude being expressed by utterances that purport to represent
the moral facts?
Moral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter.
Specically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that
moral sentences express moral propositionspropositions that represent the
existence and distribution of moral objects, qualities, and relations. Standard
noncognitivists, in contrast, typically maintain that the realist imagery asso-
ciated with morality is a ction, a reication of our noncognitive attitudes.
The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded
as something to be debunked by philosophical reection on the way moral
discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes hence the
familiar deployment of the Humean metaphor of projection. The realist c-
tion is understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not
fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical.
There is, however, another way to understand the realist ction. Perhaps
the subject matter of morality is a ction that stands in no need of debunking
but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral
sentences expressmoral propositions, just as the realistmaintains, but in utter-
ing a moral sentence competent speakers do not assert the moral proposition
expressed but rather convey by means of it the noncognitive attitude centrally
involved inmoral acceptance. Moral ctionalism is this alternative to standard
noncognitivism. Moral ctionalism is noncognitivism without nonfactualism.
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CHANGESLIDE
Not only does the distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism, and
nonfactualism raise the logical possibility of moral ctionalism, but it also
makes clear the general form of argument required to establish its truth. To
establish the truth of moral ctionalism, it suces to: CHANGESLIDE
1. argue for the psychological claimof noncognitivismCHANGESLIDE
2. argue against expressivist nonfactualism
Indeed, this was the argumentative strategy that I pursued in Moral Fiction-
alism. I am not going to talk about my case for noncognitivism, but I will
talk about the problem that formed the basis of my case against expressivist
nonfactualism. CHANGESLIDE
Three Claims Frege–Geach Problem An Old Problem in a New Guise? Meeting the Challenge Summary
Moral Fictionalism
Moral Fictionalism is noncognitivism
without nonfactualism. To establish its
truth, it suffices to:
1 argue for the psychological claim of
noncognitivism
2 argue against expressivist
nonfactualism
Figure 2: Moral Fictionalism
§  F-G P
The Frege-Geach problem was rst raised by Ross 1939, 3334 and indepen-
dently by Geach 1958, 1960, 1965 and Searle 1962, 1969 and was originally
directed at expressivist proposals such as Ayers emotivism:
It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to
express feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling, and so
to stimulate action. . . . In fact we may dene the meaning of the
various ethical words in terms both of the dierent feelings they
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are ordinarily taken to express, and also the dierent responses
which they are calculated to provoke. Ayer, 1946, 108
Ayers talk of dening the meanings of moral words suggests that he
identied the meaning of a moral word with the attitudes it expresses and
provokes.
Ayers emotivism is subject to the Frege-Geach problem because it is a
form of atomistic reduction. It is atomistic in that it assumes a one-one cor-
relation between the meanings of moral words and the linguistic actions they
perform such as the expression and provocation of the relevant attitudes. It
is a reduction in that it identies the meaning of a moral word with attitudes
it expresses and provokes. Atomistic reductions face the following dilemma:
CHANGESLIDE Suppose that freestanding and embedded occurrences of
wrong mean the same. The problem is that words can occur in embedded
contexts and fail to express the attitudes they do in freestanding contexts.
CHANGE SLIDE This diculty would be avoided if the atomistic reduc-
tion applied only to the meaning of freestanding occurrences. However, if
the account applies only to freestanding occurrences, then it is incomplete,
for the expressivist would lack an account of the meaning of moral words in
embedded contexts. Furthermore, some guarantee must be given that free-
standing and embedded occurrences mean the same despite their meanings
being dierently determined. For, if freestanding and embedded occurrences
dier in meaning, then the expressivist is apparently committed to the invalid-
ity of recognized forms of valid argument due to the fallacy of equivocation.
There are other potential problems as well. That freestanding and embedded
occurrences dier in meaning is apparently incompatible with the possibil-
ity of indirect discourse, the possibility of answering a moral question, the
possibility of denying a moral claim, and so on.
The proper target of the Frege-Geach problem is not expressivism per se,
but those expressivist semantics, like Ayers, that take the form of an atomistic
reduction. A natural Fregean diagnosis for the failure of atomistic reduction
is that it runs afoul of the attitude/content distinction. The meaning common
to freestanding and embedded occurrences of a word despite the dierence in
attitude expressed is its content. Ayers emotivism fails because it mistakes the
attitude expressed by a moral word for its content. This is what I called, in
Moral Fictionalism, the pragmatic fallacy. Dewey, in a review of Stevenson, puts
the point as follows:
One can agree fully that ethical sentences as far as their end and
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use is concerned plead and advise and speak to the connative-
aective natures of men. Their use and intent is practical. But
the point at issue concerns the means by which this result is ac-
complished. It is . . . a radical fallacy to convert the end-in-view
into an inherent constituent of the means by which, in genuinely
moral sentences, the end is accomplished. To take the case in
which emotional factors accompany the giving of reasons as if
this accompaniment factor were an inherent part of the judgment
is, I submit, . . . a theoretical error . . . Dewey, 1945, 7023
The challenge posed by the Frege-Geach problem is to explain the mean-
ings of words in embedded contexts without assuming that they express the
attitudes they do in freestanding contexts and do so in a way that will sustain
a nonfactualist interpretation. In Moral Fictionalism, I argued that this could
not be donethat an echo of the pragmatic fallacy besets even sophisticated
forms of expressivism, of the kind developed by Blackburn and Gibbard, that
do not take the form of an atomistic reduction. Whether or not that argument
is ultimately successful, moral ctionalism at least has the advantage of not
facing the familiar semantical diculties that standard noncognitivism faces.
Or does it?
One might worry that this advantage is illusorythat the nature of moral
argument is a challenge formoralctionalism aswell. Or so somehave recently
alleged. CHANGESLIDE
Three Claims Frege–Geach Problem An Old Problem in a New Guise? Meeting the Challenge Summary
The Frege–Geach Problem
The Dilemma:
1 Freestanding and embedded
occurrences of a moral word have the
same meaning
2 Freestanding and embedded
occurrences of a moral word differ in
meaning
Figure 3: The Frege-Geach Problem
6
§  A O P  N G?
Matti Eklund is prominent among thosewhoworrywhethermoralctionalism
really enjoys this advantage over standard noncognitivism. Eklund writes:
However, one may reasonably worry that the envisaged ctionalist
move doesnt in fact help at all with the Frege-Geach problem.
For someone actually presenting an argument like this would be
presenting a good argument. But for this to be so, what the arguer
actually expresses by the premise sentence must provide good
reason to accept what she actually expresses by the conclusion
sentence. Kalderons moral ctionalist faces the problem of giving
an account of what is actually expressed that respects this. But
this seems not to be essentially dierent from the traditional non-
cognitivists problem of saying what the meanings of the relevant
sentences are such that the impression that argument is valid can
be respected. Eklund, Summer 2007
CHANGESLIDE
Three Claims Frege–Geach Problem An Old Problem in a New Guise? Meeting the Challenge Summary
Frege–Geach Returns?
However, one may reasonably worry that the envisaged fictionalist
move doesn’t in fact help at all with the Frege-Geach problem. For
someone actually presenting an argument like this would be
presenting a good argument. But for this to be so, what the arguer
actually expresses by the premise sentence must provide good
reason to accept what she actually expresses by the conclusion
sentence. Kalderon’s moral fictionalist faces the problem of giving
an account of what is actually expressed that respects this. But
this seems not to be essentially different from the traditional
non-cognitivist’s problem of saying what the meanings of the
relevant sentences are such that the impression that argument is
valid can be respected. –Matti Eklund
Figure 4: Frege-Geach Returns?
I believe that Eklund is misrepresenting a reasonable challenge for moral
ctionalism as a determinate problem. To see this, lets detail the way this
challenge diers from, and so is nonidentical to and disanalogous with, the
Frege-Geach problem. CHANGESLIDE
First, the Frege-Geach problem is a dilemma for expressivism, the second
horn of which concerns, in part, entailment. Recall, atomistic reductions face
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the following dilemma: Suppose that freestanding and embedded occurrences
of wrongmean the same. The problem is that words can occur in embedded
contexts and fail to express the attitudes they do in freestanding contexts.
This diculty would be avoided if the atomistic reduction applied only to
the meaning of freestanding occurrences. However, if the account applies
only to freestanding occurrences, then it is incomplete, for the expressivist
would lack an account of the meaning of moral words in embedded contexts.
Furthermore, some guarantee must be given that freestanding and embedded
occurrences mean the same despite their meanings being dierently deter-
mined. For, if freestanding and embedded occurrences dier in meaning,
then the expressivist is apparently committed to the invalidity of recognized
forms of valid argument due to the fallacy of equivocation. The validity of
an argument is a matter of its premises entailing its conclusion. Entailment
supervenes on the semantic properties of the sentences that it relates. That is
why the meaning of freestanding and embedded occurrences being dierently
determined raises a question about entailment.
Notice, however, that Eklund doesnt raise a problem about entailment.
Indeed, there could be no problem about entailmentthe ctionalist maintains
that moral sentences have just the truth-conditional contents that the realist
assigns to them, truth-conditional contents that unproblematically determine
the relevant entailment relations. Eklunds challenge, instead, concerns the
reasonableness of moral inference, as the ctionalist understands it. Eklund
asks how a moral argument, as the ctionalist understands it, could be a good
argument, where the goodness of an argument, here, consists in providing a
reason to accept the conclusion. Whereas entailment is an abstract relation
on sentences or the propositions they express, inference is a change of view,
a transition in the epistemic states of the subject. So whereas a horn of  the
Frege-Geach problem concerns entailment, at least in part, Eklunds challenge
concerns inference. CHANGESLIDE
Second, the issue about entailment, as it arises in the context of the Frege-
Geach problem, ismotivated by a genuine, and potentially persisting, problem.
Expressivism, in its atomistic form, lack an account of the meaning of moral
words in embedded contexts and this raises a question about the validity of
moral argument. The problem potentially persists since the original rationale
for a nonfactualist interpretation is linked to the problematic, atomistic re-
duction. If there is nothing more to the content of a moral sentence than the
noncognitive attitudes that its utterance conveys, and if these attitudes can
be individuated independently of any moral object, quality, or relation, then
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the content of a moral sentence could not consist in any moral proposition
expressed. So, if expressivism abandons atomistic reduction, it must provide
some other explanation for why it determines a nonfactualist interpretation
for moral discourse. Expressivists must explain the meanings of moral words
in embedded contexts and do so in a way that secures a nonfactualist interpre-
tation for them. The problem, then, potentially persists since it is far from
obvious how this could be achieved. Indeed, in Moral Fictionalism, I argued
that it could not.
Notice, however, that Eklunds challenge is not so motivated. There is
no determinate problem for a natural, if primitive, form of ctionalism that
potentially persists for sophisticated variants. What there is is nothing more
than a reasonable queryto explain the attitudes conveyed by sincerely utter-
ing amoral sentence, attitudes that constitute the acceptance of that sentence,
in such a way that inferences involving that sentence count as reasonable.
I think this is a good question. But it is not the Frege-Geach problem.
Nor is it even a problem. At least not yet. CHANGESLIDE
Three Claims Frege–Geach Problem An Old Problem in a New Guise? Meeting the Challenge Summary
Differences
Why Eklund’s challenge is not the
Frege–Geach problem:
entailment versus inference
dialectical difference
Figure 5: Dierences
§  M  C
The remainder of this talk will explore how Eklunds challenge might be met
given the resources of Moral Fictionalism.
According to noncognitivism, moral acceptance is not belief in a moral
proposition. The dierence between cognitivism and noncognitivism is partly
a dierence in the nature of the attitudes involved in moral acceptance
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whether they are cognitive or noncognitive and partly a dierence in the
content of these attitudes whether the cognitive attitudes involved, if any,
have moral propositions as their objects.
Eklunds challenge is to specify the nature and content of the attitudes
involved in moral acceptance such that the inferences represented by good
moral arguments count as reasonable.
A variety of accounts of moral acceptance are consistent with the abstract
possibility of moral ctionalism. In Moral Fictionalism, I argued that moral
acceptance is a kind of aect akin to Scanlons 1998, chapter 1 desire in the
directed attention sense. A desire in the directed attention sense involves a
tendency to focus on the object of desire as well as a tendency for the object
of desire to appear in a favorable light.
The relevant aect is a generalization of this notion. First, it is unclear
what a tendency to focus comprises. As I understood this notion, the relevant
aect involved a tendency for certain features of the circumstance to become
salient in perception, thought, and imagination. Second, there is a sense in
which the label desire in the directed attention sense is inaptit suggests a
too narrow construal of the relevant kind of aect. Specically, it suggests
that the constituent normative appearance is invariably positive. However,
whatever Scanlons intention, I am not assuming that the object of the aect
invariably appears in a favorable light, only that there is a tendency for the
object of the aect to have a certain normative appearance, whether or not
that appearance is positive.
So far, the relevant kind of aect has been characterized in terms of its func-
tional rolein terms of the tendency of certain features of the circumstance to
become salient in perception, thought, and imagination and the tendency for
these features to present a certain normative appearance. Scanlon commits
himself to nothing further than this functional characterization.
It is natural to ask Why do these eects hang together? What is it
about the nature of this attitude that explains and renders intelligible that it
should have this functional role? A question forcefully pressed by Johnston
2001. McDowell 1998, essays 3, 10 suggests that it is natural for the
noncognitivist to conceive of this attitude as a mixed state, a noncognitive
renement of sensing, where the noncognitive component is the source of
the normative appearance. This is a substantive metaphysical proposal about
the nature of the attitude that goes beyond anything that Scanlon commits
himself to. McDowell has done much to discredit the claim that the relevant
kind of aect can be understood as a mixed state involving perceptual and
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noncognitive components that can be independently specied.
It is for this reason that inMoral Fictionalism I eschewed such an account.
If the aect were conceived to be a particular event in a persons consciousness,
then it would be reasonable to assume that its nature would be manifest in the
way it structures a persons consciousness, and so reasonable to assume that
the nature of the aect would explain and render intelligible the tendency of
the object of the aect to become salient and the tendency for it to present
a certain normative appearance. However, to assume at the outset that the
aect is a particular conscious event is to overlook a metaphysical option
available to the noncognitivist. Perhaps the aect is not some particular
event in a persons consciousness, but the way in which events in the persons
consciousness are structured. The suggestion is that there is nothing more to
being an aect of the relevant kind than the tendency for certain features of
the circumstance to become salient in perception, thought, and imagination,
and the tendency for these features to present a certain normative appearance.
This is itself a substantive metaphysical claim that goes beyond anything that
Scanlon commits himself to just as Blackburns projectivism is a substantive
metaphysical claim that goes beyond anything that Hume commits himself
to.
This conception evades McDowells criticism. The relevant aect is, to be
sure, a mixed stateit is a noncognitive attitude that involves thoughts and
perceptions about the morally salient features of the circumstances. However
these attitudes are not distinct and so could not be independently specied;
nor could they explain the way they structure a persons consciousness. The
thoughts and perceptions involved in moral acceptance are events in a per-
sons consciousness whose structure constitutes the relevant aect. CHANGE
SLIDE
So far I have characterized a class of aects. What distinguishes the
aects involved in moral acceptance from other attitudes of this class? What
distinguishes them frombeing in a badmood, for example? What is distinctive
about the aects is the particular way that they structure a persons moral
consciousness. The aects involved in moral acceptance structure a persons
moral consciousness in a way that reects the marks of moral authority.
Morality is authoritative. After all, while morality in some sense answers
to our concerns, it is also in some sense independent of them. The authority
of morality is manifest in the role it plays in moral discourse and in the
cognitive psychology of competent speakers. A full account of that authority
would involve specifying its source in a way that made it intelligible that it
11
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Desire in the Directed Attention Sense
The affect involved in moral acceptance is
nothing over and above:
1 A tendency for the object of the affect
to become salient in perception,
thought, and imagination
2 A tendency for the object of the affect
to present a certain complex
normative appearance
Figure 6: Desire in the Directed Attention Sense
should exhibit that role. The marks of moral authority are the distinguishable
aspects of the role moral acceptance plays in moral discourse and the cognitive
psychology of competent speakers.
• The rst mark of moral authority is precedence, a variant of what Rawls
1971 and Scanlon 1998 call the priority of right. Specically, in utter-
ing a moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker conveys
a reason to act in a given circumstance that potentially overrides or
cancels any conicting nonmoral reasons available in that circumstance.
CHANGESLIDE
• The second mark of moral authority is noncontingency, a mark that dis-
tinguishes moral reasons from reasons of taste. Specically, in uttering
a moral sentence that he understands, the existence of the reason con-
veyed is not contingent upon the speakers or anyone elses accepting it.
CHANGESLIDE
• The third mark of moral authority is well-groundedness. In uttering a
sentence that he understands, the grounds the competent speaker has, if
sincere, for accepting the uttered moral sentence applies not only to the
speaker but to everyone else as well. So in uttering a moral sentence that
he understands, a competent speaker accepts that sentence on behalf of
others. Hume puts the point this way:
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his an-
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tagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the language
of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself,
and arising from his particular circumstances and situation.
But when he bestows on any man the epithets of vicious or
odious or depraved, he then speaks another language, and ex-
presses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his audience are
to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from
his private and particular situation, and must chuse a point of
view, common to him and others. Hume, 1740/2003, section
9
CHANGESLIDE
• The fourthmark ofmoral authority is the demand it makes on others, and
approximately corresponds to the do so as well component of Steven-
sons 1944 analysis. In uttering a moral sentence that he understands, a
competent speaker demands that his audience accept the uttered moral
sentence.
Putting these marks of moral authority together with the account of aect
derived from Scanlon, we get the following picture: In accepting a moral
sentence that he understands, a competent speaker recongures his aective
sensibility so as to render salient, in a phenomenologically vivid manner, the
moral reasons apparently available in the circumstance, as he understands it.
It is the structure of a persons moral consciousness, and not some further fact,
that constitutes the relevant kind of aect. The relevant aect is nothing over
and above the tendency for certain features of the circumstance to become
salient in perception, thought, and imagination, and for these to present a
certain complex normative appearance. Specically, certain features of the
circumstance become salient and appear to be reasons for acting, while other
features potentially cease to be salient and can appear to be outweighed or even
ruled out as reasons for doing otherwise, even if, in normal circumstances, they
would count as such reasons. The salient features appear to be reasons that are
not contingent upon our acceptance of them. There appears to be reasons for
accepting the moral sentence, and these reasons directly or indirectly involve
reasons that ground the deontic status of the relevant practical alternatives.
These grounding reasons appear to be reasons not only for the speaker, but for
everyone else as well. They appear to be sucient reason for accepting that
sentence on behalf of others. From this perspective, the competent speaker
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can seem justied in demanding that others accept the moral sentence and
so come to respond aectively in the relevant manner. The aects centrally
involved in moral acceptance are in this way essentially other regarding. What
distinguishes the aects involved inmoral acceptance, then, is that they display
a structure appropriate to the authority of our moral claims. CHANGE
SLIDE
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Marks of Moral Authority
Precedence
Noncontingency
Well-Groundness
Demand
Figure 7: Marks of Moral Authority
Now thatwehave sketched the nature and content of the attitudes involved
in moral acceptance, lets consider a good moral argument. Indeed, lets
consider the argument that is traditionally used to display the failings of Ayers
emotivism:
1. If lying is wrong, then getting ones little brother to lie is wrong.
2. Lying is wrong.
3. Getting ones little brother to lie is wrong.
First, lets consider the attitude involved in accepting the sentence Lying
is wrong. If a competent speaker accepts this sentence, then there will seem
to be a reason not to lie, and there will be a tendency for countervailing
considerations to cease to be salient, and even where they are, there is a
tendency for these to seem to be outweighed or even ruled out as reasons for
doing otherwise. Moreover, the reason not to lie does not appear to be a reason
that is contingent upon our acceptance of it the way that reasons of taste are.
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Moreover the reason not to lie seems to be a reason no just for the speaker
but for everyone else as well including the speakers younger sibling. Indeed,
the reason appears to be sucient to accept the claim on behalf of others.
The speaker can seem justied in demanding that others accept this claim
about the wrongness of lying and so appropriately recongure their aective
sensibility.
Similar remarks apply to the attitude involved in accepting the conclusion
Getting ones little brother to lie is wrong. The only dierence is a dierence
in the object of the aect.
Given well-groundednessthat the reason provided by a moral claim ap-
plies not only to the speaker but to everyone else as wellaccepting the second
premise of the argument has as a consequence that it is wrong not just for the
speaker to lie but for the speakers younger brother to lie. But thats not the
conclusion of the argument. The argument is supposed to establish that getting
ones little brother to lie is wrong. That seems right to me. The wrongness of
getting ones little brother to lie is a further moral commitment, thus requiring
the initial premise.
Whats the attitude involved in accepting the initial, conditional premise?
The attitudes involved in accepting the antecedent and in accepting the con-
sequent are complex functional states involving the tendency for lying and
getting ones little brother to lie to become salient and to present a complex
normative appearance. It is natural to think of the attitude involved in accept-
ing the conditional claim as a higher-order functional state that structures the
speakers aective sensibilityspecically, as the tendency to have the aect
involved in accepting the consequent when having the aect involved in ac-
cepting the antecedent. It is a higher-order functional state since the aects
in question are themselves complex functional states. However, it strikes me
that the attitude involved in accepting the conditional premise is more than
having ones aective sensibility congured in this way. It involves, as well,
the endorsement of this aective sensibility. If a competent speaker accepts
the conditional sentence, If lying is wrong, then getting ones little brother to
lie is wrong, then there appears to be a reason to have an aective sensibility
congured in this way, a reason that seems to outweigh or even rule out reasons
for having a dierently congured sensibility. Moreover, the reason to have
this kind of sensibility does not appear to be a reason that is contingent upon
our acceptance of it the way that reasons of taste are. Moreover the reason
seems to be a reason no just for the speaker but for everyone else as well.
Indeed, the reason appears to be sucient to accept the claim on behalf of
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others. The speaker can seem justied in demanding that others accept this
claim and so appropriately recongure their own aective sensibility.
The reasonableness of this inference, as the ctionalist understands it,
should now be plausible, at least to a rst approximation. The speaker accepts
that lying is wrong and so has the appropriate aective attitude towards lying.
Not only is the speaker conditionally disposed to have the aective attitude
towards getting his little brother to lie given the aective attitude involved in
accepting the wrongness of lying, but he also authoritatively endorses that his
aective sensibility be congured in this way. It is reasonable, then, that, given
these commitments, he should come to have the aective attitude towards
getting his little brother to lie that is involved in accepting that it is wrong to
get ones little brother to lie. CHANGESLIDE
Three Claims Frege–Geach Problem An Old Problem in a New Guise? Meeting the Challenge Summary
A ‘Good’ Moral Argument
1 If lying is wrong, then getting one’s little brother to lie is
wrong.
2 Lying is wrong.
3 Getting one’s little brother to lie is wrong.
Figure 8: A GoodMoral Argument
S
Webegan with the distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism, and nonfac-
tualism. Whereas the former is a psychological claim, the latter are positive and
negative semantic claims. Again, if there is one thing to take away fromMoral
Fictionalism, it is the recognition that these are logically distinct claims. The
logical distinctness of these doctrines raises the possibility of moral ction-
alism, of noncognitivism without a nonfactualist expressivism. CHANGE
SLIDE
One advantage that moral ctionalism has over standard noncognitivism
is that it is not subject to semantical diculties that arise in the wake of
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the Frege-Geach problem. Specically, a nonfactualist expressivism faces a
potentially persistent diculty in explaining moral entailment, a diculty not
similarly faced by moral ctionalism. CHANGESLIDE
Nevertheless, as Eklunds worry shows, there is a question, not aboutmoral
entailment, but about the reasonableness of moral inference. How is that
moral inferences that we ordinarily count as reasonable count as reasonable
when understood as the ctionalist understands them? CHANGESLIDE
Finally, I suggested that it is plausible, at least to a rst approximation, that
such inferences would in fact be reasonable, as the ctionalist understands
them. In Moral Fictionalism, I argued that the attitudes involved in moral
acceptance were a generalization of Scanlons notion of desire in the directed
attention sense. Given the nature and content of these attitudes and how they
bear on the conguration of a persons moral sensibility, the reasonableness of
moral inference is prima facie plausible. Nothing that Eklund says suggests
otherwise.
Three Claims Frege–Geach Problem An Old Problem in a New Guise? Meeting the Challenge Summary
Summary
The distinction between noncognitivism, expressivism, and
nonfactualism
The Frege–Geach problem raises a problem for how the
expressivist nonfactualist accounts for moral entailment
Eklund’s objection is no objection but a challenge for the
fictionalist to explain the reasonableness of moral inference
Given the nature and content of the attitudes involved in
moral acceptance (according to the account given in Moral
Fictionalism), it is prima facie plausible that such inferences
are reasonable
Figure 9: Summary
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